Religion, Spirituality and Virtue by Radford, J. & Radford, J.
 
 
University of East London Institutional Repository: http://roar.uel.ac.uk  
 
This paper is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please 
scroll down to view the document itself. Please refer to the repository record for this 
item and our policy information available from the repository home page for further 
information. 
 
To see the final version of this paper please visit the publisher’s website. 
Access to the published version may require a subscription. 
 
Author(s): Radford, John 
Article title: Religion, Spirituality and Virtue 
Year of publication: 2009 
Citation: Radford, J. (2009) ‘Religion, Spirituality and Virtue’ Transpersonal 
Psychology Review, 13 (2), 50-57 
Link to published version: http://www.bpsshop.org.uk/Transpersonal-
Psychology-Review-Vo-13-No-2-Winter-2009-P1081.aspx  
 
Transpersonal Psychology Review, 2009, 13(2), 50-57 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
RELIGION, SPIRITUALITY AND VIRTUE 
 
John Radford 
University of East London 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address for correspondence: 
 
Professor John Radford 
38 Cephas Avenue 
London E1 4AT 
 
Tel:  020 7791 0595 
E-mail:  j.k.radford@btinternet.com 
 
Transpersonal Psychology Review, 2009, 13(2), 50-57 2
Religion, spirituality and virtue 
 
John Radford 
 
 
 
‘Religion’, ‘spirituality’ and ‘virtue’ are often used with the implication that they are 
closely related, or even the same thing, though other uses distinguish them.   Of various 
possible modes of definition, an operational one seems the most helpful.   Religion can 
best be taken as a polythetic concept, defined by a selection from a list of characteristics.   
Spirituality has several different meanings, while virtue corresponds to one entity, with 
much agreement, though also some disagreement, as to what counts as virtuous.   The 
three overlap in some respects but are distinct in others.   It is desirable to be clear about 
precisely what is meant in any discussion of them. 
 
 
‘Religion’, ‘spirituality’ and ‘virtue’ (or in the last case a similar word, such as wisdom, 
or morality, or goodness) are often used with the implication that they are inextricably 
linked, sometimes almost as if they are interchangeable.   To give just a few examples, 
Jones, Wainwright and Yarnold (1986), under the title ‘The Study of Spirituality’, say:  
‘We are concerned with the individual prayer and communion with God, both of the 
“ordinary Christian” and of those with special spiritual gifts’.   Hardy (1979) published 
‘The Spiritual Nature of Man:   A Study of Contemporary Religious Experience’.   
Vincent Nichols, the newly appointed Roman Catholic Archbishop of Westminster, was 
quoted in The Daily Telegraph, 29th March 2009, to the effect that ‘Britain has 
increasingly abandoned spiritual and moral principles in favour of secularism … social 
values such as compassion, respect and tolerance (will) be lost if disconnected from their 
roots in Christian teaching’.   These all suggest identity.   Others propose a close 
relationship.   For example Whomsely and Seims (2008) argue that ‘religion can be 
conceptualized as different from spirituality.   Perhaps, spirituality can be understood as a 
property of the Universe that can be felt and experienced by the individual, whereas 
religion is the institutionalised, formalized way of experiencing that is based on faith, and 
what other people believe or have believed’.   Similar views have become quite popular.   
The singer Neil Sedaka said in an interview (Metro, 23rd June 2009):  ‘I am a spiritual 
person – not a religious person – but I feel some higher power when I write and when I 
saw the birth of my children and grandchildren’.   Bartlett (2006) found in a sample of 
1600 American professors in the natural and social sciences, over two thirds thought of 
themselves as ‘spiritual’.   Other studies suggest that fewer than that number would be 
‘religious’, and Bartlett found 22% of those who actually said they were atheists, also 
said they were ‘spiritual’.   For many scientists, Bartlett suggests, spirituality has replaced 
religion.   Heelas and Woodhead (2005) make a similar claim in general. 
 
Cline (2009), however, rejects this distinction on the grounds that there is nothing that 
can be said of the one that cannot also, at least sometimes, be said of the other, for 
example that they involve a personal quest for God (however defined), that they employ 
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more or less prescribed procedures, and so on.    Neither is better or worse than the other.   
He argues that the distinction arose, at least in the USA, out of a general tendency 
towards the rejection of authority in the 1960s, with an individualistic ‘spirituality’ being 
seen as better than a conformist ‘religion’.  Certainly organized religion is currently 
declining in Western countries including the U.S.A. (Altemeyer, 2004).    Zinnbauer, 
Pargament and Scott (1999) urge that the two concepts should be integrated, rather than 
polarized.    Humanist thinkers on the other hand, for example Kurtz (1988), have long 
argued that moral or other ‘virtues’, and ‘spiritual’ qualities,  have nothing intrinsically to 
do with religion.   An Anglican bishop has made a case for ‘keeping religion out of 
ethics’ (Holloway, 1999).  Snyder and Lopez (2007), from a ‘positive psychology’ 
perspective, assert that religion and spirituality (and perhaps by implication virtue) should 
not be equated.    
 
Definitions 
It seems desirable to be clearer about what the words do, or should, refer to.  There is a 
danger of thinking that because there is one word, there must be one thing to which it 
refers (a common problem in psychology, as witness the long debates over the meaning 
of ‘intelligence’, for example).   There are various approaches to definition, for example 
stipulative, lexical, essentialist, operational (Radford, 2006).   The first might be called 
the Humpty Dumpty method, stating what one intends a term to mean.   The second is the 
dictionary meaning, how a term is used within a particular language group.   The third 
tries to identify usually one defining characteristic, sometimes with the implication of 
stating what a term ‘really’ means.   The fourth is concerned with what functions or 
counts as the thing in question.   Each of these can be appropriate in different cases.   The 
lexical approach is often a good start, and where better than the Oxford English 
Dictionary, Concise version (4th edition, 1951) in this case.   For ‘religion’ this gives five 
senses.   The two relevant ones are:  ‘one of the prevailing systems of faith and worship’, 
and ‘human recognition of superhuman controlling power and especially of a personal 
God entitled to obedience’.   ‘Religious’ means essentially being imbued with, or 
concerned with, religion.   For ‘spirituality’ there are six senses, only one being relevant 
here:  ‘quality or condition of being spiritual; attachment to or regard for things of the 
spirit as opposed to material or worldly interests’.  But ‘spiritual’ includes ‘of spirit as 
opposed to matter’, ‘concerned with sacred or religious things’, and ‘having the higher 
qualities of the mind’.  For ‘virtue’ there is ‘moral excellence, uprightness, goodness’.  
‘Virtuous’ means having these qualities.    (The senses I have dismissed are, for example, 
‘ecclesiastical property’ for ‘spirituality’.)   ‘Moral’ itself can cause confusion.   There is 
a tendency to think of it primarily in relation to sex, but the dictionary refers essentially 
to a distinction between right and wrong.   Indeed ‘virtuous’ can have a slightly 
pejorative ring to it, a suggestion of priggishness.   These definitions would certainly help 
a person who did not know the meaning of the terms, and that is what a dictionary is for.    
But they clearly raise many questions, such as, what exactly is moral excellence, or what 
of ‘religious’ systems such as Zen Buddhism which pay little or no attention to worship 
or a deity.  An essentialist definition (which has often been applied to religion in 
particular) is not likely to fit, as all three terms seem to have many components.   A 
stipulative definition can apply if we wish to restrict the discussion: ‘When I mention 
religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion, but the 
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Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England.   And 
when I mention honour, I mean that mode of divine grace which is not only consistent 
with but dependent upon this religion ’ –  Reverend Thwackum, debating whether honour 
is possible without religion, in The History of Tom Jones, Henry Fielding,1749.   Rather, 
therefore, an operational approach seems the most useful. 
 
Religion 
Taking the terms in turn, in the case of religion I have suggested that a special case of an 
operational definition is when there is not an exact match between different examples of 
what is being defined (Radford, 2006).   What we need then is a polythetic or ‘family 
resemblance’ type of definition.   Two farmers, for example (or perhaps two 
psychologists) may overlap hardly at all in what they actually do or are, yet there is no 
argument that they belong in the same category.   Similarly with religion.   If, like Dr 
Johnson’s ‘Observation’ with extensive view, we survey mankind from China to Peru, we 
find a host of varying behaviours that count as religions.   They all share some of a family 
of characteristics.   Several writers have offered lists of these, e.g. Alston (1967) and 
Brown (1988).   I drew on these to make a list of twenty (Radford, 2006).   This is not 
meant to be definitive, nor are they all equally salient or peculiar to religion.   Briefly, 
they are:  belief in supernatural beings;  distinction between sacred and profane;  ritual;  
moral code;  religious feelings (awe etc);  prayer;  a sense of purpose for the individual 
and the universe;  a corresponding organization of life;  a social group;  doctrine;  
sacrifice;  priesthood;  retreat and pilgrimage;  myth, legend and history;  expression in 
the arts;  spiritual development;  mystical experience;  iconography;  ceremonies and 
festivals;  a formal organization.   Obviously each of these can be expanded at great 
length.   A few might be regarded almost as necessary conditions for the label ‘religious’, 
for example some belief in the supernatural, whether a personal or impersonal entity, or a 
state of being quite distinct from that of ordinary experience.   But I doubt if any one 
component, or even two or three, could be regarded as sufficient. 
 
Religions can also vary in many ways, both between themselves and even within one 
carrying the same title.   These ways are generally matters of emphasis rather than sharp 
divisions.   Alston (1967) suggests three major groups of religious orientation, the 
sacramental, the prophetic and the mystical.   Some of the ways in which these differ are,   
first, the location of the divine; respectively in things (holy objects, places, books etc) and 
procedures; or in human society, and revelation to humans; or in individual experience.   
Second, response to the divine:  by ritual; or by acceptance, that is faith; or by practices 
conducive to mystical experience.   Third, the place of doctrine:  it is less important in the 
sacramental type, very important in the prophetic type, and unimportant or lacking in the 
mystical type.   All these are tendencies, which intermingle, and the balance of which 
may change with time.   It might be better to consider them as dimensions, along each of 
which a religion can vary.   But predominantly, ‘popular’ Hinduism and other 
polytheistic religions (such as that of classical Greece, which Alston does not mention), 
and ‘primitive’ religions generally, are of the sacramental type.   The emphasis is on 
correct procedures and rituals.   Judaism, Islam, and Confucianism, Alston considers as 
of the prophetic type, and Buddhism and ‘philosophical’ Hinduism as of the mystical 
type.   But there is, for example, a strong mystical stream in Islam, particularly in Sufism, 
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and a sacramental one in Tantric Buddhism.   Christianity emerged from prophetic 
Judaism but developed strong sacramental aspects especially in the Middle Ages, as well 
as mystical ones with individuals such as St Teresa and many others.   Today, the Roman 
and Greek churches tend more towards the sacramental, the Protestant ones to the 
prophetic, and the charismatic ones to the mystical.    
 
Two further dimensions might be these.   One might be termed elitism, the extent to 
which all can participate fully in every aspect of the religion.   Some regard all members 
of the religion as themselves an elite, compared to those outside it:  a ‘chosen people’.   
Others have as it were grades of membership, such as priests and laity.   The other 
dimension is the emphasis on what might be called good conduct, rather than procedures, 
faith or personal experience.   The Emperor Ashoka in the third century BCE adopted 
Buddhism, and is said to have regarded it as expressing the essence of all religions, which 
he summarized as ‘Few faults, many good deeds, pity, generosity, truthfulness, purity’ . 
 
Spirituality 
‘Spiritual’, and ‘spirituality’, it seems to me, are in a different case.   Rather than a set of 
family resemblances, the words are used with several distinguishable meanings, though 
these frequently overlap.   One is ‘religious’ in a formal sense, as in Lords Spiritual and 
Temporal.    A second is ‘not materialistic’, concerned with things of higher value in 
some sense.   A third might be called ‘experiential’, but in a special sense, which in 
religion would be called ‘mystical’.   Mystics such as Thomas Merton (e.g. 1976) may 
assert that their experiences are unique in several ways.   But it seems too restrictive to 
deny the word ‘spiritual’ to non-religious heights of experience, such as profound 
feelings of empathy and compassion.   Both the second and third senses are close to the 
dictionary meaning of ‘higher qualities of mind’.   And a fourth sense is belief in, or 
awareness of, a realm of existence other than that of normal reality.   Most if not all 
religions have held that there is some form of non-corporeal existence, whether of 
humans (a soul), or some other beings (gods, demons) or both.  Or some impersonal 
‘transcendental’ level of existence.  But such beliefs, again, can also be held with no 
religious implications.    
 
We can go further.   Aesthetic experience too, in creating or appreciating great art, can 
surely be said to be spiritual.   Those who excel at sport report something at the highest 
levels of achievement that is very like a mystical ecstasy.   Indeed this idea has become 
something of a cliché in oversimplified Western notions of Zen Buddhism.   Eugen 
Herrigel’s book Zen in the Art of Archery (1953), which was not really Zen, has been 
followed by more than two hundred similar titles, as well as films such as The Karate Kid 
(1984), and sequels.   Several writers have broadened the concept and considered 
‘spirituality’ in a general, inclusive way as ‘the search for being fully human’ (King, 
2001), or as ‘an innate human characteristic [which] involves the capacity for self-
transcendence:  being meaningfully involved in, and personally committed to, the world 
beyond an individual’s personal boundaries’ (Perrin, 2007).  This author writes from a 
Christian standpoint, but that world could be simply other humans, or in a Buddhist way, 
‘all beings’.   Such views might almost substitute the word ‘virtue’ for ‘spirituality’.    
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Virtue 
The second and third meanings of spirituality quoted above, ‘higher qualities of the 
mind’, are close to that of ‘virtue’.   But this is again different.   Here there seems to be 
one ‘thing’ to which it refers, namely a set or sets of desirable human characteristics.  The 
question is what these are.   They are perhaps mainly considered in terms of behaviour 
and personality traits (such as generosity, courage, devotion and so on), but also in terms 
of experiences and emotions (such as delight, ecstasy, compassion).   Probably every 
culture, and every religion, has had an explicit or implicit set of traits considered 
admirable.  They vary in many ways.   One is in stressing the benefits either to the 
individual (such as salvation), or to society (as in philanthropy).   Another is in regarding 
them as innate qualities of a select few, often a nobility or aristocracy, or attainable in 
principle by all, in a meritocracy.   And, of course, there are various lists of the traits 
actually considered admirable.   It is easy to think of specific examples where there 
would be sharp disagreement.   ‘Turning the other cheek’ would not be highly regarded in 
warrior cultures such as those of Homeric Greece or mediaeval Japan.   Our own 
(Western) culture generally admires heroic self-sacrifice, but balks at kamikaze pilots and 
suicide bombers.  Genghis Khan is supposed to have said:  ‘To kill your enemy, seize his 
horses, rape his women, enslave his children – that is true happiness’, and presumably 
true virtue (few people would consider that what they value most highly is morally 
wrong).   Fortunately not many would agree with Genghis.    
 
There have been many attempts to establish a universal system of virtues or morals, of 
what is right and wrong.   Some have considered virtues to have some supernatural 
source, in monotheistic systems often directly handed down by God, as the Ten 
Commandments were to Moses, and the Qu’ran to Mohammed (via the Angel Gabriel).   
A minority of the human race believe each of these particular myths, and each version is 
defended as the only true one.   A second approach might be called intuitive.   An 
example would be the American Declaration of Independence:  ‘We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, etc.’  The problem with this is that it is not 
self-evident.   (The ‘truth’ did not prevent them owning slaves, so it was not as self-
evident as all that, even to them.)  What the Founding Fathers might better have said is 
that all men ought to be considered equal.   A third approach is the logical, rational one, 
exemplified by Immanuel Kant’s ‘categorical imperative’.   ‘Act only according to that 
maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.’   
Philosophical debate has continued ever since as to whether this or similar grounds are 
sufficient.   An objection at a simple level is that it is very difficult to see how it applies 
to particular cases.   Is it good to give to the poor?   If so, how much, and to whom 
precisely?   And what would be the consequences if it did become a universal law?   
(This objection was raised by the Emperor Julian ‘the Apostate’ to Jesus’ injunction to a 
rich man to sell all he had and follow him.) 
 
There is certainly much variation in what is considered right or wrong, as in the aims and 
nature of ‘spiritual’ development.   But at some level, there is also a great deal of 
commonality.   Moses, for example, was told ‘Thou shalt not kill’ (Exodus 20:13).   The 
precise meaning of this is debated, but God also ordered the death penalty for cursing 
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one’s father and mother, and adultery, and any number of other sexual transgressions 
(Leviticus 20).   This exemplifies the matter.   Almost certainly, nearly all human beings 
would agree that it is, in general, wrong to take a human life.   A few would take this as 
an absolute, with no possible exceptions.   But the vast majority would qualify it, in 
different ways, for example for self-defence, protecting others, legitimate wars, capital 
punishment, abortion, religious sacrifice and so on.   Broadly, the lists of rights and 
wrongs of probably all religious and non-religious systems overlap to a great degree.   As 
I have put it elsewhere, the devil is in the detail.     
 
A fourth approach appears to be helpful, which can be called empirical, based on 
examining what people do in fact consider right and wrong.   The ‘positive psychology’ 
movement led by Martin Seligman and others has focused on human happiness.   This is 
related to desirable personality traits.   Their analysis gives six ‘virtues’, each associated 
with a number of ‘character strengths’, or aspects of that virtue.   The six are wisdom and 
knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence.   Studies of the 
character strengths across forty different countries yield very high levels of agreement as 
to their desirability, with correlations of around .80.   Agreement is highest for kindness, 
fairness, authenticity or genuineness, gratitude and open-mindedness.   These are 
followed by prudence, modesty and self-regulation.   There are no significant cultural, 
ethnic or religious differences (Seligman, Steen and Peterson, 2005).  
 
Hauser (2006) argues that underlying cultural variations there is ‘a universal moral 
grammar’, deriving from common properties of the human mind that constrain the range 
of possible development.   This seems to be true in other dimensions of human 
experience such as language, music, sport and religion.   Hauser refers specifically to 
Chomsky’s idea of an innate potential for language, such that children can acquire a 
specific one without having to learn separately every detail of it.   Hauser uses the word 
‘instinct’.   I would prefer the term of the perhaps forgotten British psychologist William 
McDougall (e.g. 1932), ‘propensity’, an inherited tendency towards certain sorts of 
behaviour, which are, of course, modified by environmental factors.     Hauser reports 
studies in which subjects, in different language groups, made judgments of moral 
dilemmas.   These were very largely consistent with two established legal principles, one 
‘the prohibition of intentional battery’, roughly that one should not go around hitting 
people, the other that of ‘double effect’, that some harm may be condoned if it is not 
intentional, and the intention was to achieve some foreseeable good which outweighs the 
harm.   In one study up to 90% followed these principles.   But of these, 70% were unable 
to state the principles when asked to justify their decisions.  This is not surprising as it 
has long been established that we often can’t state reasons for judgments (Evans, 1989).  
Thus, it is argued, we often know what we ought to do but not why.    If this is correct, 
we might suggest that gods were invented, not so much to make us do things, as to 
explain why we do them.   Several writers have proposed that why we do them, is 
because they have proved successful in the course of evolution, for example, Broom 
(2006).   Complex animal societies, he says, are most successful if members minimize 
harm caused to one another, and if collaboration occurs.   Here are the roots of morality, 
which in humans is codified and given the authority of religion and/or law.   This is of 
course very similar to the view of religion itself proposed by anthropologists such as 
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Atran (2002) and Boyer (2001), evolutionary psychologists (Bulbulia, 2007), and the 
classical historian Burkert (1996).     
 
Relationships 
Considering religion, spirituality and virtue in terms of definitions, a lexical type was a 
starting point.   Both the essentialist and the stipulative modes seem inappropriate.   
When we look at how the words are actually used, in an operational way, it appears that 
the three words ‘religion’, ‘spirituality’ and ‘virtue’, refer to rather different kinds of 
thing ‘Religion’ refers to a conglomerate, which generally includes among other things a 
belief in non-material existence, and a set of values, with an associated code of conduct.   
‘Spiritual’ refers to several things, which overlap with religion but also have non-
religious application.  In addition ‘spiritual’ has a meaning of aesthetic or other 
excellence which religion does not (of course there is art that expresses religion, but that 
is another matter).   ‘Virtues’ indicates a set of desirable traits, which overlaps with both 
religion and spirituality, but is also free-standing, as it were. 
 
The question then arises of just how each of the three relates to the others.   Observation 
suggests that they are not to be equated.   There are clearly, for example, both religious 
and non-religious individuals who are virtuous, or aesthetic or indeed spiritual, or on the 
other hand lack these characteristics.   Church-going can be merely formal, and many 
avowedly religious persons have been insensitive to any higher qualities.  Conversely  
compassion, self-sacrifice and artistic achievement are not rare among the non-religious.    
Saucier and Skryzypinska (2006), with a sample of 375 American adults, compared 
‘tradition-oriented religion’ (TR) and ‘subjective spirituality’ (SS).  Using a battery of 
measures, they found that TR and SS are highly independent, that is scores on one do not 
predict scores on the other.   Each does correlate with other factors:  TR correlates highly 
with authoritarianism and traditionalism, to some extent with collectivism, and to a small 
extent with openness to experience.  There is a high reliance on tradition-hallowed 
sources of authority providing shared practices including rituals, and rules for social and 
sexual behaviour.   SS  is associated with absorption, fantasy, dissociation, beliefs of a 
magical or superstitious sort, eccentricity, high openness to experience, and a conviction 
of the importance of individual experiences, including intuitions and fantasies.   These 
two dimensions are not to be equated, however, with particular denominations or even 
whole religions.   But those who do identify with a denomination tend to be higher on 
TR.   These differences also show up in non-religious people.   An individual can be 
tolerant or neutral towards traditional church-going, but scornful of ‘mystical’ 
experiences, or vice versa; or of course positive, or negative, to both.   The authors warn 
against generalizing from a purely American sample, but these results do seem to show 
that it is a mistake to lump ‘religion and spirituality’ together as a single aspect of human 
behaviour.   Similarly MacDonald (2000) sought to relate spirituality to the well 
established ‘Big Five’ model of personality.   He distinguished five components of 
spirituality, concluding that it is a complex yet identifiable construct that includes but 
extends beyond religion and religiousness. 
 
One way in which religion and virtue appear to differ is just this one of commonality, or 
agreement.   There is pretty well universal agreement that some set of ‘right’ 
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characteristics is desirable and achievable.  There is honour even among thieves.  But 
there is strong disagreement as to whether religion as such is desirable, and if it is, 
whether it can or should be one system.   For some it is the most vital of human 
experiences, giving meaning to all the rest, while to others it is at best a dead-end and at 
worst positively harmful.   Similarly, there is as noted widespread agreement as to which 
characteristics are, in general, good ones, but there is notoriously conflict, all too often 
violent, over the merits of different religions, and even over variations within the same 
faith.   For thirteen centuries Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims have been at loggerheads over 
the true successor to the Prophet.   Roman Catholics are split over birth control, 
Anglicans over women bishops, and so on endlessly.   Somewhat similar points could be 
made about spirituality and virtue.   The widow of Edward Johnston, the great 
calligrapher, said ‘My husband was a saint.   But saints can be terribly difficult to live 
with’. 
 
Conclusion 
It seems that human beings have a range of propensities, to use McDougall’s term, which 
includes such things as visual representation, music, language, as well as religion with its 
various components, spirituality in its different senses, and virtue however considered.  
Older writers used the word ‘instincts’, as does Hauser.  Many evolutionary psychologists 
speak of ‘modules’.  These uses may not all be exactly equivalent but they appear to be 
approximately so.  There is clear evidence that such traits have a genetic element (e.g. 
Bouchard et al., 1999; Bradshaw and Ellison, 2008), but are also the product of culture 
and environment.   These propensities are at least partially independent of each other.   It 
appears that each of the triumvirate of religion, spirituality and virtue can exist, in some 
form, independently of the others.   None provides necessary and sufficient conditions for 
either of the others.  Theoretically at least, an individual might occupy one of eight 
positions, from possessing all three characteristics, through any combination, to none at 
all.    At the same time there are complex interconnections between all three.   It is 
desirable to sort these out, and to be clear what it is that we are referring to on each 
occasion. 
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